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"

"Idon't know [what weapons will be used in the Third World War].
But I can tell you what they'll use in the Fourth-rocks!

I. INTRODUCTION

War has been an ingrained part of human culture. 2 So much so, that
* J.D. Candidate, Suffolk University Law School, 2018. B.A. History and Legal Studies,
University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2013.
1. Interview by Alfred Werner with Albert Einstein (Apr.-May 1949), in ALBERT
EINSTEIN, THE ULTIMATE QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 165 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2011).
2. See Joshua J. Mark, War, THE ANCIENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2009),
https://www.ancient.eu/war/ [https://perma.cc/Z7Z2-KR86] (discussing the roots of war lie in
ancient civilizations).
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conflicted societies have engaged in social and political struggles that
lasted for centuries. 3 Historically, wars have been extreme acts of
physical engagement. 4 Traditional warfare has always been fought on a
battlefield, in the sky or in the sea. 5 For centuries, scholars, soldiers,
politicians and civilians have viewed war as bhaving a necessary physical
aspect and the word "war" is widely defined to include armed conflict. 6
The advent of the Internet created a new method by which to both
develop a more efficient and interconnected society but also developed
new means by which adversaries could engage in conflict with one
another. 7 Numerous cyber-incidents and cybercrimes on the U.S. critical
infrastructures have been reported, and the likelihood of cyber-incidents
occurring against the infrastructure has been recognized.8 If a cyberattack were to actually penetrate the systems of, for instance, the fuelsupply line, the electric grid or hydropower providers, the results would
be devastating to life in the United States. 9
3. See id. (describing the notion that war is an age-old concept within society).
4. See id. (emphasizing war has been understood to include physical contact).
5. See id. (characterizing the physicality of traditional warfare and highlighting the
physical components); see also Timothy Noah, Birth of a Washington Word: When Warfare Gets
"Kinetic," SLATE (Nov. 20, 2002, 6:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/
chatterbox/2002/11/birth of atwashington-word.html [https://perma.cc/WX58-2FA3] (defining
kinetic warfare that has a devastatingly physical component to it. Kinetic warfare is "active, as

opposed to latent. Kinetic warfare is the act of "dropping bombs and shooting people" to kill
people as society perceives traditional warfare).
6.

See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 7 (June 12, 2015)

[hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (providing the definition of the law of war).
7. See DEP'T OF DEF., THE DoD CYBER STRATEGY,
(Apr.
17, 2015),
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoDCYBE
R_STRATEGYfor-web.pdf[https://perma.cc/285-E7W5]
[hereinafter
DoD
Strategy]
(discussing the history of the Internet and its positive uses as well as the vulnerabilities. The true
invention of the Internet has roots in the year 1969, when scientists created a tool to share
information amongst one another. While the Internet provides much value to our social and

economic society, "this reliance leaves all of us-individuals, militaries, businesses, schools and
governments-vulnerable in the face of a real and dangerous cyber threat"). See also JEFFREY
CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE Xv-Xvi (Mike Loukides ed., 2d ed. 2012) (explaining the successes
and drawbacks of the Internet as a token of society).
8. See What is CriticalInfrastructure?,DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (last updated July
12, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure
[https://perma.cc/E2HS-QFDG]

(defining "critical infrastructure" and highlighting the variety of components it has. "There are 16
critical infrastructure sectors that compose the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a
debilitating effect on security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof."
Critical infrastructure refers to the essential services that provide water, power and natural
resources, financial assets and other systems and networks that serve as the skeletal structure for
American life).
9. See Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Special Report: The Cyberwar Threatfrom North Korea,
Fox NEWs (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/02/14/cyberwar-experts-questio
n-north-korea-cyber-capabilities.html [https://perma.cc/SM3C-YU2R] (illuminating the potential
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Thus far, none of the past reported cyber-incidents or crimes have yet
to be considered an "act of war" by lawmakers under the traditional
definition of an act of war. 10 Policy makers and scholars are
acknowledging the more physically destructive a cyber incident's effects
are, the more likely it will be treated as an armed attack.1 1 A cyber-attack
causing the same level of physical destruction as its physical counterpart
has not yet occurred in the United States. 12 Though an attack meeting this
threshold has not occurred, the protocols in place adequately provide for
and encompass an appropriate response by the United States in the event
a cyber-attack does occur. 13
This Note will discuss and compare the history and definitions of
traditional warfare and contrast potential acts of war through the lens of
the cyber realm and describe examples of past attacks on both the United
States and other governments. 14 It will continue on to examine incidents
that have occurred on various components of the U.S. grid and also
explore the most famous and first true cyber-attack, the Stuxnet worm.15
Finally, this Note will analyze and apply the existing laws and traditional
legal framework surrounding the use of force and armed attack thresholds
to ultimately conclude that a Stuxnet-like attack should legally be
considered a true cyber-attack of war. 16

for grave danger the U.S. citizen population could be in following a cyber-attack).
10.

See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE

4 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (explaining generally what
international law encompasses in terms of what constitutes an act of war).
11.

See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 24 (Nov. 1999) http://www.au.af.millau/awc/
awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2WH-9X4W]
[hereinafter LEGAL
ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS] (analogizing cyber-attacks to traditional warfare and how

their outcomes must present different conclusions. "Computer network attacks are likely to
present implication that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with

traditional weapons").
12. See Danny Vinik, America's Secret Arsenal, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:57 AM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-cyber-offense-strategy-000
331 [https://perma.cc/QV55-RKVL] (realizing the United States has yet to truly face this potential
disaster. When a cyber-attack does occur though, the American public is going to expect an
adequate response).
13. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 997 (highlighting the likelihood that cyber
operations will be subject to the law of war rules depending on the nature of the cyber incident);
see also William Jackson, How Can We Be at Cyberwar if We Don't Know What It Is?, GCN
(Mar. 22, 2010), https://gcn.com/articles/2010/03/22/cybereye-cyberwar-debate.aspx [https://
perma.cc/ 88L4-V5XB] (realizing the gray areas of this situation).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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II. HISTORY
In recent years, the international community has emphasized the need
for clarification on what a cyber-attack would have to look like in order
for a response to comply with the framework set forth by the U.N. Charter
and how to distinguish these types of activities from widely recognized
activities of cybercrime. 17 Part of this new problem is defining what
cyberspace is and how it fits into the existing legal framework governing
peacetime and times of war.1 8 Cyberspace is a hybrid of tangible assets
but also "the environment created by the confluence of cooperative
networks of computers, information systems, and telecommunication
infrastructures." 19 This means that the information can be physically
stored on a computer system or in transit in a telecommunications
structure. 20 Cybercrime, therefore, refers to a crime committed in
cyberspace. 2 1

Increasingly, more of the world's civilian population has access to a
computer, making it easy for any deviant to infiltrate the grid.2 2 In terms
of holding someone responsible for masterminding an act against another
state, both individual actors and state actors have been treated and
prosecuted as criminals for financial hacks and data theft.23 However, the
potential result of a cyber incident causing physical property damage or
civilian death needs to be analyzed in a different framework.2 4 For
17. See TALLINN MANUAL, supranote 10, at 3 (addressing the need for clarification on how
and what parts of international law applies to activities in cyber space).
18. See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 15 (1999)
(articulating what cyberspace consists of).
19. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 15 (defining cyberspace).
20. See id. (defining further what constitutes as cyberspace).
21. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 10, at 4 (distinguishing cybercrime as different from
a cyber-attack).
22. See Examining How to Combat Cyber Attacks by Improving Prevention and
Prosecution:Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism and Gov't Info. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1-3 (2000) (statement of Hon. Jon Kyl, Chairman, Subcomm. on Tech.,
Terrorism and Gov't Info.) (acknowledging that quite literally anyone with computer access and
willingness to learn how to hack could perform malicious activity in cyberspace).
23. See Jackson, supra note 13 (distinguishing potential cyber warfare from cybercrime).
See also Catherine A. Theohary & John W. Rollins, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43955,
CYBERWARFARE AND CYBERTERRORISM: IN BRIEF (2015) (providing an example of a common
type of attack). In a distributed denial of service ("DDoS") attack, servers are overwhelmed with
traffic, so access is denied or degraded). See also SYMANTEC CORPORATION, INTERNET SECURITY
THREAT REPORT 5, 8 (2016) (providing examples of different types of cyber incidents that are
considered cybercrime).
24. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 997 (providing an example of when a
cyber-attack should be considered an act of war); see also Jarno Limnell, The Danger ofMixing
Cyberespionage with Cyberwarfare,WIRED (last visited Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.wired.com/
insights/2013/07/the-danger-of-mixing-cyberespionage-with-cyberwarfare/ [https://perma.cc/XE
2D-XU7E] (comparing the aspects of cyber warfare and cyber espionage that are inherently linked
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example, if an actor releases a piece of malware into one of the critical
infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid, this could cause massive
power outages, spoiling food supplies and leaving people freezing. 25 This
action looks different than financial theft, where the "destruction" is
found solely in the realm of cyberspace, with minor physical incidental
costs. 26 The analysis is on the effect, rather than the cause, of the action
to determine if the cyber-attack meets the threshold of an armed attack.2 7
It is clear traditional laws of war will apply to cyber operations but it is
unclear in exactly what capacity they will apply. 28
A. CurrentApplicable Law
As a member of the United Nations, the U.N. Charter mandates when
and how the United States can respond to an armed attack. 29 Article 2 of
the U.N Charter advises all members to refrain from using force against
any other state, while Article 51 is explicit in that all states have an
inherent right to self-defense. 30 The main purpose of the United Nations,
and specifically the Security Council, is to maintain international peace
and security. 3 1 Members of the United Nations are subject to sanctions if
they fail to abide by the U.N. Charter or engage in some act that disrupts

but also inherently different. Cyber espionage, or cyber spying, may be viewed as preparation for
warfare as an intelligence effort or may be used to justify pre-emptive or preventative actions);
See also 6 U.S.C.S. § 1531 (2012) (characterizing an "international cyber criminal" and
recommending types of consequences for that actor. An international cyber criminal is an actor

who is "believed to have committed a cybercrime or intellectual property crime against the
interests of the United States).
25. See Vlahos, supra note 9 (offering a grave thought as to what the wake of a cyberattack may look like).
26.

See OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ASSESSMENT, INTELLIGENT ASSESSMENT: DAMAGING

CYBER ATTACKS POSSIBLE BUT NOT LIKELY AGAINST THE US ENERGY SECTOR 1 (2016)
[hereinafter INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT] (acknowledging most of the activity directed at critical
infrastructure is financially or ideologically motivated).
27. See Jackson, supra note 13 (stressing the need to explicitly determine what
distinguishes a cybercrime from a potential act of cyber warfare); see also Vinik, supra note 12
(contrasting conventional war's well-understood weapons and strategies from the unknown
aspects of cyber-attacks and its capabilities).
28. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 998 (stressing that the traditional law of
war applies to non-traditional methods. "[Clyber operations may not have a clear kinetic parallel
in terms of their capabilities and the effects they create . . . operations may have implications that
are quite different from those presented by attacks using traditional weapons, and those different
implications may yield different conclusions"); see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 10, at 3
(explaining the challenges law makers are facing when determining how to apply international
law to cyber operations).
29. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶[4, art. 51 (binding the United States to its promulgations).
30. See id. (outlining the rules set forth by the applicable U.N. Charter provisions).
31. U.N. Charter art. 39 (providing the scope of the U.N. Charter).
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international peace.32 While the United Nations act as a police power, it
has been criticized that the sanctions imposed may not achieve the
intended goal.3 3 Critics argue that sanctions do not work because the
eventual effect of the sanctions has a negative humanitarian impact.34
Sanctions function as a more peaceful alternative to further acts of
aggression to punish or deter the aggressor state, but are often criticized
for not being implemented effectively in the aftermath of an act of
aggression. 3 5

Specific to the United States, the Law of War Manual provides
guidelines on how the laws of war apply to physical armed conflict and
how conflicts are assessed and treated in times of war and peace. 36
However, the Law of War Manual acknowledges that "how the law of
war applies to cyber operations is not well-settled" and there will be
developments in the application of existing law to operations in
cyberspace. 37 Additionally, the Rules of Engagement are defined as
"directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or
continue combat engagement with other forces." 3 8 U.S. military
32. See id. (explaining the specific resolutions within the U.N. Charter that determine
whether an engagement rises to the level of a threat of aggression); U.N. Charter art. 41 (providing
for economic sanctions and exploring when it is appropriate to impose them); U.N. Charter art.
42 (imposing military sanctions on non-abiding member states); see also Jan Hurd, The U.N.
Security Council and the InternationalRule of Law, CHINESE J. INT'L POL. 3, 5 (2014) (furthering
the stance of when and what sanctions can be imposed on non-abiding states).
33. Dana Shamlawi, The United Nation Security Council's Continued Use of Economic
Sanctions, E-INT'L RELATIONS (Apr. 17, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/R76N-X9Z6
(criticizing the use and implementation of economic sanctions as a method of compliance,
subversion, deterrence and symbolism).
34. See id. (providing an example of a group that has felt the negative impacts of the U.N.
sanctions. For example, the sanctions imposed on Iraqi civilians in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait
fueled an already injustice felt by the Iraqi people).
35. See id. (highlighting the stipulations within the U.N. Charter promoting the sanctions);
see also Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 J. INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997,
at 90, 92-93 (cautioning that sanctions are not the most effective way to "punish" non-abiding
Member States).
36. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 7 (defining the law of war as a term of art)

("The law of war is part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the conduct
of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both international and non-international armed
conflict . . . and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States. [T]he
law of war has been used to inform the content of general authorizations to conduct military
operations. Generally, the law of war is treated as prohibitive, in the sense that it seeks to forbid
the use and resort to armed force when deemed necessary to do so).
37. See id. at 994 (acknowledging the existing uncertainties in the realm of how the existing
law applies to cyber operations).
38. See U.S. Marine Corps, Law of War/Introduction to Rules of Engagement, B130936,
STUDENT HANDBOOK, 13, 16 [hereinafter Rules of Engagement] (qualifying the rules governing
conflicts of war. The objectives are rooted in the theory that "the object of war is nonetheless to
ensure the submission of the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible).
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personnel are expected to abide by both the laws of war and the rules of
engagement when engaged in conflict to defeat the enemy as efficiently
as possible with the least amount of force necessary. 39
Much of the U.S. infrastructure is privately owned and government
regulated.40 Since 2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has been the regulatory agency responsible for overseeing the
reliability of the bulk power system with the goal of putting the necessary
infrastructure on the "smart grid." 4 1 The "smart grid" is the system that
incorporates information technology into the day-to-day operations of the
critical infrastructure industry. 42 FERC ensures the physical safety and
functionality of the smart infrastructure, but FERC's authority is
extremely limited to regulation of the cyber grid.4 3 Under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, FERC has the conferred authority to institute
compliance and safety standards, but not explicit power to defend its
systems. 44 Where FERC has the regulatory authority to oversee the
protection of its systems, there is a disconnect between having protection
power and immediate decision-making power to launch a retaliatory
attack.45
The Department of Defense has developed protocols to encompass its
responsibilities in the time of an attack.46 Most incidents in the cyber
39. See id. (defining and explaining the Rules of Engagement. The purpose of the ROE is
to achieve national policy goals while abiding by general principles of law while engaged with
the enemy).
40.

See Gordan Corera, CYBERSPIES: THE SECRET HISTORY OF SURVEILLANCE, HACKING,

AND DIGITAL ESPIONAGE 290 (2015) (describing how the infrastructure is owned. Because the
infrastructure systems are normally held in private hands, it asks the question of whose
responsibility it is to defend them. Industry owners are typically incapable or not willing to spend
the money on proper security measures and the government is hesitant to get heavily involved.
Another issue with the infrastructure is that it was built long ago and is both complex and
interconnected, making it difficult for both owners and the government to figure out how and
what is truly critical to defend and protect).
41. See Cyber & Grid Security, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (explaining

the purpose of FERC and defining the "smart grid"). Since 2005, the electric industry has been
shifting its systems, including hydropower, natural gas and oil, to operate on the smart grid. FERC
is aware that while seeking to be reliable and efficient, it also needs to be mindful of potential
vulnerabilities and potential losses of service).

42. See id. (defining the "smart grid" and introducing the idea of putting critical
infrastructure on a massive information technology system).
43. See id. (describing what FERC is allowed to do within its scope of authority).
44. See Corera, supra note 40, at 290-91 (questioning what body has the authority to
protect the necessary infrastructure even if it is owned).
45. See Cyber & Grid Security, supra note 41 (explaining the regulatory authority of
FERC. Additionally, FERC certified the North American Electric Reliability Organization

(NERC) as the nation's reliability organization which has developed the Critical Infrastructure
Protection cyber security reliability standards).
46. See DoD Strategy, supra note 7, at 4-5 (outlining the three-part strategy for missions
in cyberspace. This three-part plan was established to ensure the United States is both prepared
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realm are easier to classify as an intelligence operation rather than a
military objective. Thus it is unclear how the Department of Defense
should, could and would respond in the wake of a cyber-attack. 47 It is

clear that the Department of Defense has set forth new strategies detailing
how cyber capabilities can be integrated into the existing framework.4 8
While these various sources of law dictate what the United States can and
cannot do in times of war and peace, there is not explicit language
explaining how cyber-attacks fit within the laws of war, if they are
considered either a use of force or an armed attack, potentially requiring
a requisite retaliatory attack. 49 However, the Law of War Manual does
provide a catchall sort of analogy-if a cyber-attack looks like a kinetic
attack, the response will be that of a kinetic attack. 0
B. Distinguishing"Attacks" and "ArmedAttacks"
The definitions of "attack" and "armed attacks" differ depending on
the context and application of the terms. 5 1 An "attack" is a particular type
of military operation that is an act of "violence against the adversary,
for an incoming cyber-attack as well as prepared to respond, if necessary to one. The three primary
objectives of the Department of Defense are: (1) to defend its own networks, systems, and
information; (2) be prepared to defend the United States and its interests against cyber-attacks of
significant consequence and (3) if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide
integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingent plans).
47. See Vinik, supra note 12 (indicating that potential cyber offensives attacks would be
categorized as an intelligence movement for ease and to avoid taking responsibility for such an
operations); see also David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in
Cyberstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), archivedat https://perma.cc/EC3T-Q9AF (declaring that
the President of the United States acting as the Commander-in-Chief should have the sole
authority to unleash a cyber weapon); see also Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 33, 11739
(Feb. 19, 2013) (acknowledging the U.S. cybersecurity problem and promulgating the
development of the Cybersecurity Framework); see also Establishment of the Cyber Threat
Intelligence Integration Center, 80 Fed. Reg. 41, 11317 (Mar. 3, 2015) (establishing the Cyber
Threat Intelligence Integration Center to analyze and investigate threats and incidents relating to
national interests).
48. See Vinik, supra note 12 (emphasizing some framework has been set by the
Department of Defense in regards of what should be done in connection with a potential cyberattack).
49. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining "there are no treaty provisions
that directly deal with 'cyber warfare'); see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 994
(asserting that international law does apply to cyber warfare. The Law of War Manual expressly
states that international law does apply to cyber capabilities, but the challenge is determining what
considerations decision makers should apply to existing international law).
50. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 997 (treating potential cyber-attacks
causing physical destruction like a traditional kinetic attack).
51. See Michael N. Schmitt, "Attack" as a Term ofArt in InternationalLaw: The Cyber
Operations Context, 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 283, 285 (2012)

(describing the definition and threshold of the word "attack" depends on the context in which it
is being used).
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whether in offence or in defence." 52 This is the threshold definition in
international law on the grounds that most prohibitions and restrictions
apply only to acts that qualify as "attacks." 53
It is necessary to distinguish what constitutes an "attack" from an
"armed conflict." 54 An "armed conflict" differs from an "attack" in the
sense that an armed conflict refers to an "action that gives States the right
to a response rising to the level of a 'use of force."'5 5 An "armed attack"
would trigger a state's right to use force in self-defense. 56 The principle
of an "armed attack" derives its legal threshold in international law from
the U.N. Charter, which provides "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." 57 This
allows States the authority to proportionately respond to an act when nonforceful means would otherwise be inefficient.58
Every member of the United Nations has an inherent right to selfdefense and "competent authority" to wage war for a public purpose. 59
Under this theory, force may only be used as self-defense necessary "to
repel . . . the armed attack and to restore the security of the party
52. See id. (exploring the definition of "attack" under the Geneva Convention's standards.
The word "attack" as applicable is a neutral term in the realm of war because "some attacks are
lawful, whereas others are not, either because of the status of the object of the attack or how the
attack is conducted).

53.

See id. (highlighting the threshold component of the definition of an "attack").

54. See id. at 286 (distinguishing the differences between an attack and an armed conflict).
55. See id. at 285 (defining an armed conflict. Two potential instances would create an
armed conflict, the first being an international conflict between States and the second being noninternational conflicts where a "certain level of intensity and organization between a State and an

organized armed group or between organized armed groups").
56. Andrew C. Foltz, Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber "Use-of-Force" Debate,
JOINT FORCE Q. 40, 42 (Oct. 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/Z2NX-67VZ (discussing when a
state could invoke their right to use force as a method of self-defense).
57. U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing the guidelines for when an attack can be considered
armed); see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 39, 78 (distinguishing between jus ad

bellum and jus in bello theories. Jus ad bellum refers to the "law concerning the resort to force"
whereas jus in bello refers to the "law concerning conduct during war." Jus ad bellum theory has
the potential to raise questions of national policy that would ultimately be decided by the
Executive Branch, National Security Council and other relevant departments and agencies. Jus in
bello laws can be understood as arising from a party intending to conduct hostilities and when
parties are actually conducting hostilities).
58. See Priyanka R. Dev, "Use of Force" and "Armed Attack" Thresholds in Cyber
Conflict: The Looming DefinitionalGaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response," 50
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 379, 384 (2015) (synthesizing when an act meets the threshold of an armed
attack).
59. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 40 (acknowledging the power to wage war
in a power of the State); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4 (explaining when states should not
resort to force. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations").
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attacked." 60 Where there is physical damage or harm inflicted on person
or property, an attack will be considered an "armed attack." 6 1
C. Distinguishingthe Threshold of "Use ofForce"
The "use of force" threshold is slightly different and is a slightly lower
bar than that of an armed attack.62 The applicable U.N. Charter provisions
states "[a]ll members shall refrain ... from the threat of use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 63 Though there is no black letter rule of what constitutes as "use
of force," the principle encompasses "consequences of coercive
activities" and "consequences that pose the greatest threat to international
peace and security."64 The "use of force" threshold is considerably lower
than the "armed attack" threshold because the U.N. Charter allows a
response to an armed attack that could be potentially more devastating
than the initial attack.6 5 The Law of War Manual recognizes "if cyber
operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means,
would be regarded as a use of force . . then such cyber operations would
likely also be regarded as a use of force." 66
60.

See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 41 (asserting the specific instances where

proportionate means of force may be used. "Assessing the proportionality of measures take in
self-defense may involve considerations of whether an actual or imminent attack is part of an
ongoing pattern of attacks or what force is reasonably necessary to discourage future armed

attacks or threats thereof").
61. See Dev, supra note 58, at 387 (stating the necessary physical aspect of an attack to
qualify the act as an armed attack).
62. See Foltz, supra note 56, at 41-42 (explaining that there is not a clear definition of what
use of force means); see also Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw in Cyberspace:Remarks as
Preparedfor Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, 54 HARV. J. INT'L
L. 1, 4 (2012) (explaining that the law allows States to respond to a cyber-attack with the use of

force. "There is no legal requirement that the response to a cyber armed attack take the form of a
cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality").
63. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Foltz, supra note 56, at 41-42 (describing the
problems with the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter only applies to members of the United Nations
and therefore, does not encompass the conduct of non-state actors).
64. See Foltz, supra note 56, at 42 (describing the threshold of use of force. "[T]he use of
force threshold has traditionally been viewed as lying somewhere between purely economic and
political coercion on the one hand and activities that result in physical damage or injury on the
other").
65. See Dev, supra note 58, at 387 (distinguishing the differences between the threshold
levels of "use of force" and "armed attack"); see also Schmitt, supra note 51, at 285 (highlighting

that Article 51 is an exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter. "Article 51, recognized as reflective
of customary international law by the vast majority of legal scholars, is an express exception to
Article 2(4)").
66. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 997-98 ("[I]f the physical consequences
of a cyber-attack constitute the kind of physical damages that would be caused by dropping a
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The "use of force" threshold is a strict instrument-based approach and
it is unclear when it could be applied to cyber activities that might not
cause physical harm. 6 7 The "use of force" threshold differs from that of
an armed attack and the "use of force" definition is understood "to include
a military attack of one state by the organized military of another state"
and also applies to "all agencies and agents of a state government."68
Scholars have suggested that the more a cyber operation resembles an
armed attack, the more likely and willing States will be to classify it as a
prohibited use of force. 69
D. Potentialof a Cyber-Attack on CriticalEnergy Infrastructure
Though a cyber-attack has not yet occurred on the U.S. critical
infrastructure, the threat is existent. 70 In 2016, the Department of
Homeland Security released a report highlighting the history of threats
against the U.S. energy sector, which classified the cyber activity as "lowlevel cybercrime that is likely opportunistic in nature rather than
specifically aimed at the sector . . . and is not meant to be destructive."71
The report attributes the fear to the overuse of the term "cyber-attack" in

bomb or firing a missile, that cyber-attack would equally be subject to the same rules that apply
to attacks using bombs or missiles") (citing Koh, supra note 62, at 3-4).
67. See Foltz, supra note 56, at 42 (citing an example of where cyber operations may not
meet the "use of force" threshold. "According to a strict instrument-based interpretation, even
highly disruptive peacetime cyber operations may not qualify as a use of force because they lack

the traditional kinetic characteristics associated with armed force").
68. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 82-83 (defining a "use of force." This category applies to
a plethora of potential actors "such as the organized military, militia, security forces, police forces,
intelligence personnel, mercenaries, and other surrogate forces or volunteers").
69. See Foltz, supra note 56, at 42-43 (likening cyber operations to traditional warfare).
70. See Office of Intelligence & Assessment, Intelligence Assessment: Damaging Cyber
Attacks Possible but Not Likely Against the US Energy Sector, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 13 (Jan. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Intelligence Assessment] (evaluating the actuality of an imminent
cyber threat. Homeland Security assesses a targeted attack against the U.S. energy sector as a
crime of cyber espionage and data threat. The report indicates that the media reports and overuses

the phrase "cyber-attack" to encompass all incidents of cybercrime, rather than referring to
activities that would cause severe disruption and destruction); see also U.N. Secretary-General,
Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of InternationalSecurity, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/70/172 (July
22, 2015) (describing how the development and usage of information and communications
technologies (ICTs) are emerging military threats); see also Vinik, supra note 12 (noting that the
world is in a state similar to that of the Cold War. The problem with cyber incidents is that there
is so much that is invisible to the public as a whole, but also to lawmakers and experts. The
invisibility of the cyber realm is a major reason it is difficult to completely quantify the threat
accurately).
71. See Intelligence Assessment, supra note 70, at 1 (explaining the recent history of cyber
activity in the United States).
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open source media to refer to even the lowest level cybercrimes.7 2 But
simply because the threat is assessed as low and "opportune in nature," is
not an excuse to not address the problem. 73 However, the advanced nature
of these attacks is becoming more precise and targeted at specific pieces
of infrastructure, emphasizing the growing need for adequate security
measures and responses to be put in place.74
For example, in 2015, Ukraine power companies experienced
widespread power outages in their critical infrastructures impacting about
225,000 customers. 75 Hackers synchronized their attacks, staggering the
attacks within thirty minutes of each other at each affected power
company.7 6 In this case, the actors used remote administration tools and
"KillDisk" malware to erase files on the targeted systems to prevent
restoration and leave the system inoperable.7 7 It appears that all actors
had legitimate credentials to initially access the companies' systems
however there is also a likelihood that "BlackEnergy" malware was used
to initially access the systems. 78
Following a variety of U.S. government sponsored teams, including
the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (U.S.-CERT), the
Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation traveled to Ukraine to assess
the damage. 79 While this attack did not occur on U.S. soil, the occurrence
demonstrated the possibility of an attack on the U.S. systems and the U.S.
acknowledgment demonstrates a seriousness to determine appropriate
response measures. 80

72. See id. at 5 (qualifying the past incidents as low-level threats).
73. See id. at 2 (suggesting ways that owners of energy sector assets can better protect their
systems).
74.

IDAHO NAT'L LAB,

CYBER THREAT AND VULNERABILITY

ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.

ELECTRIC SECTOR 2 (2016) (cautioning the developing sophistication of potential threats).
75. See ICS-CERT, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01):
Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure (Feb. 25, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/MFF9-MAGT (introducing the "Black Energy" attack on the Ukrainian power
systems).
76. Id. (explaining how the attack was carried out).
77. Id. (describing the malware utilized to successfully execute the attack).
78. Id. (recognizing the various potential access points the actors had to execute the attack).
79. Id. (identifying the American response teams who assessed the damage overseas. The
other group was the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC)/Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)).
80. Id. (discussing the reasons multiple U.S. teams traveled to Ukraine. The purpose of the
trip from so many U.S. government agencies was to share information to prevent future cyberattacks).
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III. PREMISE

A. The Dam
In 2011, Iran-based hackers were able to remotely access the
computer system that controlled a small dam in New York.8 1 Though the
dam was offline at the time, the hackers had access to the water
temperature and ability to operate the sluice gate. 82 While the New York
dam is exponentially smaller than the likes of the Hoover Dam, this attack
demonstrated the abilities of hackers to target and infiltrate a piece of
infrastructure on American soil. 83 This attack represented the very real
ability of a group of hackers who were able to access the control systems
of a dam, and the possibility and likelihood of success that other hackers
will be able to infiltrate other pieces of vital infrastructure in the future. 84
The N.Y. Attorney General indicted the Iranian group for conspiracy to
commit and aid and abet computer hacking and the individual defendant,
Hamid Firoozi, who was specifically responsible for accessing the dam's
controls was also charged with obtaining unauthorized access into the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems of the dam. 85

81.

Joseph Berger, A Dam, Small and Unsung is Caught Up in an IranianHacking Case,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/rye-brook-damcaught-in-computer-hacking-case.html?_r-0 (introducing an attack specifically targeted at U.S.
infrastructure); see also Eric Larson et al., IraniansHacked From Wall Street to New York Dam,
U.S. Says, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 24, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/5QUV-8DZE

(outlining the Iranian groups mission and accomplishments); see also Max Kutner, Alleged Dam
Hacking Raises Fears of Cyber Threats to Infrastructure, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 2016,
http://www.newsweek.com/cyber-attack-rye-dam-iran-441940(comparing the attack to Alfred

Hitchcock's movie Saboteur. The plot of Hitchcock's classic was a conspiracy to blow up the
Hoover Dam. This attack shows that the potential for hackers to actually blow it up and that it is
not just a fiction only possible in a movie).
82. See Larson et al., supra note 81 (discussing that the actuality of the effects was not
destructive but illustrating what could have happened. At the time of the attack, the gate was
offline for scheduled maintenance).
83. Berger, supra note 81 (stressing the gravity of the attack even though the dam was a
small one and acknowledging the potential damage would have been minimal in comparison to
an attack on a much larger dam).
84. See Kutner, supra note 81 (opining on what kind of damage can potentially be done);
see also Mark Thompson, Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War, TIME

(Mar. 24, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/J4LP-85PP (illustrating how this attack shows what
the future of warfare will look like).
85. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEVEN IRANIANS WORKING FOR ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS-AFFILIATED ENTITIES CHARGED FOR CONDUCTING COORDINATED
CAMPAIGN OF CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. FINANCIAL SECTOR (Mar. 24, 2016), archived at

https://perma.cc/BQ23-CHMP [hereinafter
individuals).

DEP'T OF JUSTICE]

(listing the charges for the charged
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B. Past Cyber Incidents
In 1997, a Massachusetts teenager hacked into a Bell Atlantic
computer system that managed flight control for the Worcester Regional
Airport and his success of hacking into the system disrupted power to the
control tower for nearly six hours. 86 In 1998, two California teenagers
successfully disrupted troop deployments to the Persian Gulf. 87 The
teenagers were influenced by a Middle Eastern hacker and the attack was
coordinated with such skill, that it was initially believed to have been the
work of Iraq.8 8 The Massachusetts attack became the first time a juvenile
was charged with a Federal computer crime; recognizing the criminality
of the action in cyberspace. 89 In 2001, Chinese hackers infiltrated
American domains, using early forms of "worms" to cause the systems
90
to react in what became known as the "World Wide Web War."
C. The Stuxnet Worm
There are various ways that an attack that could be detrimental to the
U.S. grid and at the forefront of that discussion is the Stuxnet worm. 9 1
The Stuxnet worm has been labeled the most complex malware ever and
has also earned the name of the world's "first real cyberweapon." 92 In
86. 146 CONG. REc. 28, 974-75 (2000) (explaining the potential danger this incident
presented).
87. Id. at H974 (describing the gravity of this particular attack).
88. Id. (discussing the confusion and difficulty of initially identifying the hacker); see also
Serge Schmemann, As Iraqi Tension Eases, Arabs Criticize U.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/27/world/as-iraqi-tension-eases-arabs-criticize-us-rol
e.html (explaining the deep tensions between the United States and the countries in the Gulf in
the late 1990s).
89. Carey Goldberg, Federal Chargesfor Juvenile in a Case of Computer Crime, N.Y.
TIEs (Mar. 19, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/19/us/federal-charges-for-juvenile-ina-case-of-computer-crime.html (explaining the circumstances of the charged crime and the
general concern of government officials at the time regarding cyber-attacks).
90. Craig S. Smith, May 6-12; The First World Hacker War, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/13/weekinreview/may-6-12-the-first-world-hacker-war.html
(terming the engagement the "World Wide Web War I"); see also Paul Kerr et al., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41524, THE STUXNET COMPUTER WORM: HARBINGER OF AN EMERGING

WARFARE CAPABILITY 1 (Dec. 9, 2010) (highlighting the powerful effect of 'worms' as a
malicious software).
91. Foltz, supra note 56, at 41 (explaining the Stuxnet as the "watershed event" in the
framework of what constitutes as use of force as a cyber-attack); see also Kim Zetter, How Digital
Detectives DecipheredStuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011),
https://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/
(describing why
Stuxnet is such a threat).
92. Zetter, supra note 91 (distinguishing the Stuxnet worm from other forms of malware);
see also Kerr et al., supra note 910 (differentiating between Stuxnet and its predecessors); Corera,
supra note 40, at 278 (quoting former NSA and CIA director, Michael Hayden).
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2009, the virus was released into Iran's nuclear program, destroying
nearly one fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges and hindering the Iranian
nuclear program, at least by a few years.93 The reason why the Stuxnet
virus is so dangerous is because of its "method of infection" in that the
malware was "self-replicating and designed to infect systems that were
not connected to the Internet." 94 It is estimated that Stuxnet was
specifically directed at solely targeting the Iranian centrifuges and caused
severe physical damage to as many as 1000 centrifuges. 95 The Stuxnet
attack on a piece of Iran's critical infrastructure is an example of a cyber
weapon causing physical damage, that some argue constituted a use of
force. 96 So where does Stuxnet leave United States in law making and
policy around cyber-attacks and should a Stuxnet-like attack on a piece
of the U.S. critical infrastructure be categorized and codified as a "use of
force?"
D. CurrentLegislation
The United States is working on legislation aimed at creating a more
effective strategy for how the country would handle a cyber-attack and
evaluating the unknowns about cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities. 97
Policy makers know what a traditional act of terrorism would look like;
on the other hand, the scope of damage caused by a cyber-attack is
unknown and unclear if and how the resulting damage would be similar
to a traditional attack of war. 9 8 The unknown factor of the potential attack
93. See Zetter, supra note 91 (categorizing the type of damage done by the Stuxnet virus
to Iran's nuclear program); see also Corera, supranote 40, at 273 (describing the process to enrich
uranium and the moments after the attack).
94. See Foltz, supra note 56, at 44 (emphasizing the devastating and unique capabilities of
Stuxnet).
95. Id. (highlighting the severity of the Stuxnet attack).
96. Id. (reiterating the severity and uniqueness of the Stuxnet attack); see also Henry
Kenyon, What Would a Stuxnet-type Attack in the US Look Like?, GCN (Sept. 7, 2011),
https://gcn.com/articles/2011/09/07/ds-summit-stuxnet-lessons-learned.aspx
(describing the
repercussions of an Stuxnet attack on the United States and contrasting it to that of the attack in
Iran).
97. See Intelligence Assessment, supra note 70, at 4 (providing examples of potential
mitigation strategies); see also Brent Kesler, The Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilitiesto Cyber
Attack, NPS STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 15 (2011) (explaining that the discussion surrounding cyber
security policy has been speculative); Vinik, supra note 12 (defining cyber weapons and

comparing cyber weapons to "capabilities").
98. Press Release, Jim Himes, Members of Cybersecurity Subcommittee Call for
Cyberwarfare Rules (Nov. 5, 2015), Cybersecurity Subcommittee Call for Cyberwarfare Rules
(Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with the author) (explaining the unclear standards currently in place that
would ward against a cyber-attack); see also 161 CONG. REc. 179, 9255 (2015) (extending the
scope of the Homeland Security Act relating to providing assistance to state and local
governments in regards to cyber security); Cyber Preparedness Act of 2016, H.R. Res. 5459, 114th

Cong. (2016) ("An Act to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance preparedness

156

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 22

is why open source media describes a bleak picture of what life could be
like following a cyber-attack.99
The effects of a potential cyber-attack could look like a traditional,
kinetic destruction but the appropriate response is not codified, as the
initial "attack" would not be launched utilizing physical force. 100 Sponsor
of House Resolution 5220, known as the Cyber Act of War Act of 2016,
Jim Himes explained:
What if Iran melted down one server at Florida Power and Light?
They do $5,000 worth of damage. That sounds to me like a crime,"
Himes said. "But what if they melt down a whole bunch of servers,
a network goes down and a bunch of people die? That feels to me
like an act of war. But these lines aren't drawn. Because they're
not drawn, is our response to have the FBI investigate and file a
diplomatic d6marche? Or is our response to do a cyber reprisal? Or
is our response to do a kinetic reprisal? We don't know. I think
that's a real problem. 10 1
Congressman Himes bill aims to have the Department of Defense

and response capabilities for cyberattacks, bolster the dissemination of homeland security
information related to cyber threats, and for other purposes"); 146 CONG. REc. 28, supra note 86,
at H974 (recognizing a potential cyber threat has been discussed in the legislature for nearly two
decades).
99. See Bill Buchanan, This is What Cyber Warfare Between Nations Would Look Like,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/cyber-warfare-between-countries-look488267 [https://perma.cc/L3JM-86P2] (depicting what the actual scene would look like if there
was to be a successful attack on the energy infrastructure); see also Kesler, supra note 97, at 18

(describing a hacker's success in getting in an Australia water control system thereby releasing
raw sewage into parks, rivers, and hotels); see also Tara Dodrill, Napolitano Warns Downed
Power Grid Is Inevitable Due to Cyber Attack, OFF THE GRiD NEws (last visited Nov. 25, 2016),
http://www.offthegridnews.com/grid-threats/napolitano-warns-downed-power-grid-is-inevitabl
e-due-to-cyber-attack/ [https://perma.cc/XZD4-33NT] (recounting former Department of

Homeland Security Janet Napolitano's fears and views on what needs to be done to strengthen
the energy grid. "While we have built systems, protections and a framework to identify attacks
and intrusions, share information with the private sector and across government, and develop

plans and capabilities to mitigate the damage, more must be done, and quickly"); see also Bill
Hoffman & Jason Devaney, Ex-Defense Chief U.S. Vulnerable to TerrorAttack on Power Grid,
NEWSMAX (June 29, 2015), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/William-Cohen-defense-chie
f-terrorist-attack-power-grid/2015/06/29/id/652742/ [https://perma.cc/DR7Z-9BUG] (illustrating

former Secretary of Defense William Cohen and former CIA analyst Peter Vincent Pry's stance
on the notion that the U.S. energy grid is a "sitting duck" for an attack).
100. See Vinik, supra note 12 (addressing a cyber-attack's results might look like those of
traditional drawn warfare, but the uncertainty and unknown response methods are detrimental).
101. See Himes, supra note 98 (emphasizing the need for a change in the laws to combat a

changing landscape for terrorism. The goal of Congressman Himes' bill is to make people aware
that the United States has the capability to protect itself and should use that capability
accordingly).
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amend the laws of war to create a clear plan of determining when an act
in cyberspace meets the threshold of "use of force" and establish clear
protocols when and if the United States was the receptor of a large scale
attack. 102
It is necessary that the government and military have a prepared
response available if a cyber-attack were to occur on U.S. soil. 103 Since

much of the U.S. infrastructure is privately owned, there is an inherent
disconnect of communication between those who own and control our
infrastructure and the government entities who would handle potential
retaliation. 104
IV. ANALYSIS
Cyber warfare is a military problem and cybercrime is an issue for law
enforcement but activities classified as cybercrimes are likely the
precursor to potential acts of cyber warfare.1 05 The physical result of a
cyber action is what would qualify a particular act as an act requiring
responsive force; most activities that are currently perceived as a cyberattack only merely amount to a cybercrime.106 Data breaches and
distributed denial of service "attacks" are both recognized as criminal
activity and while intrusive and debilitating, neither of those examples

102. See id. (explaining what Congressman Himes hopes to achieve with his new bill.
Included in Congressman Himes bill is a provision that would require the President to develop a
policy from determining when an action in cyberspace constitutes as force against the United
States and revise the Law of War Manual. Additionally, the bill asks the President to consider
"the ways in which the effects of a cyber-attack may be equivalent to the effects of an attack using
conventional weapons, including with respect to physical destruction or casualties" as well as
examine the intangible effects of such an attack).
103. See Intelligence Assessment, supra note 70, at 2 (reiterating that government agencies
have claimed the threat is low of a cyber-attack on the energy infrastructure); but see Vinik, supra
note 12 (emphasizing the need for an implementation of guidelines and protocols in the time of a
cyber emergency).
104. See Kenyon, supra note 96 (explaining that U.S. infrastructure is controlled by private
firms. In order for an adequate response, there needs to be some sort of communication between
the private firms and the government to create an appropriate prior response).
105. See CARR, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining the differences in repercussions of cybercrime
versus cyber warfare. Though cybercrime may not initially be a threshold problem to be examined
under the laws of war, cybercrime is the laboratory or playground for cyber warfare techniques to
be developed. "Cyber Terror is often Cyber Warfare utilizing Cyber Crime").
106. See IntelligenceAssessment, supra note 70, at 2 (assessing the incorrect uses of "cyberattack" in reporting that has led to a societal misconception about cyber threats); see also Limnell,
supra note 24 (stressing the importance of correctly labeling and distinguishing terms of a cyberattack and an act of cyber warfare).
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cause true physical damage to persons or property. 10 7
Cybercrime is more common than attacks that meet the threshold of
cyber warfare. 108 It is unlikely that entire wars will be fought online in
the immediate future, but cyber operations should be viewed as the fifth
dimension of warfare because there will likely not be a war fought
without cyber technology. 109
A Cyber-Attack as a Use of Force
A qualifier of an armed attack is the physicality of the attack.1 10 As
previously mentioned, there have been reported incidents of individuals
using the Internet to disable power to the Worcester Regional Airport and
of individuals disrupting troop deployments." These two examples
resulted in no known individual injuries or real damage to property, but
demonstrated a potential for hackers to get into U.S. systems. 112 Though
the U.N. Charter provides every State with an inherent right to selfdefense, not every incident that resembles an attack warrants the usage of
this power. 113 As the Charter provides, a State may respond with
proportional force "reasonably necessary to promptly secure the
permissible objectives of self-defense." 1 14 One of the main goals of the
use of force threshold is to not cause unnecessary collateral destruction
107. See SYMANTEC CORPORATION, supra note 23, at 10 (discussing in 2010, there were 318
data breaches, 9 of which exposed 10 million identities. Smart phones are a major source of targets

because of the amount of personal data that is stored on an individual's phone).
108. See Intelligence Assessment, supra note 70, at 1 (discussing the media frequently
mislabels cybercrime as cyber-attacks).
109. See Limnell, supranote 24 (asserting that cyber capabilities are a weapon and the fifth
dimension of warfare); see 146 CONG. REC. 28, supra note 86, at 974 (characterizing cyber conflict

as different from traditional war because of its invisible components. "Unlike the growth of a
large super-power army, unlike the proliferation of arms from a hostile nation state, we cannot

readily or easily see the development of the cyber threat." Speaker Robert Andrews identified a
cyber conflict is "unlike any threat that we have faced in the history of our republic ... the silent
but deadly threat of cyberterrorism" and "the quiet but lethal assault on our country's systems and
people"); see also CARR, supra note 7, at 45-46 (acknowledging the difficulty in catching
perpetrators when they are committing a cyber-attack).
110. See Dev, supra note 58, at 387 (highlighting the necessary physical component of an
armed attack).
111. See 146 CONG. REC. H974, supra note 86 (detailing the 1997 incident that disabled
power to the Worcester, Massachusetts airport. Though power was disrupted for a few hours, no
one was injured as a result of the loss of power); see also id. at H974-75 (describing the 1998
troop disruption. Again, no injuries were reported as a result of the interception of
communications).
112. See id. at H974 (detailing the results of the 1997 incident at the Worcester airport).
113. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 38 (highlighting when a use of force response is
appropriate. A use of force as a means of self-defense is justified for many uses of force and
especially at the time an armed attack occurs).
114. See id. (explaining when and how a Nation can use force as self-defense).
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or injury to civilian humans. 115 Because the actors in those two incidents
were groups of civilians with bad motives but sophisticated abilities and
the amount of damage that they actually caused was minimal, the proper
retaliation for their actions would not be using an responsive use of
force. 116 Additionally, the U.N. Charter suggests that the use of force
must reach a certain 'gravity,' following from the principle of
proportionality. 1 17 Therefore, "minor frontier incidents are not per se uses
of force that rise to the Article 2(4) threshold.""
However, these types of incidents differ drastically and should be
categorized much differently than a potential attack similar to the Stuxnet
attack. 119 Because the Stuxnet attack actually and physically crippled
vital infrastructure in Iran, it follows that another attack of the same
gravity would likely cripple its target to some degree. 120 What causes a
Stuxnet-like attack to be treated differently than a cybercrime, is the
potential effects that the cyber-attack to cause physical damage, like a
bomb or a missile could. 121 This damage demonstrated the physical
capacity of a cyber capability, this attack shows what type of effects a

115. See id. at 39 (discussing when a self-defense use of force would be inappropriate).
116. See id. at 37-38 (noting that international law prohibits purely retaliatory or punitive
actions); but see Koh, supra note 62, at 4 (providing examples of when incidents would likely

constitute an appropriate use of force. Among these examples is "operations that disable air traffic
control resulting in airplane crashes"); see Sharp, supra note 18, at 37-38 (noting that
international law prohibits purely retaliatory or punitive actions); see also 146 CONG. REc. 28,
supra note 86, at 974-75 (explaining because neither of these attacks resulted in a calculable
amount of damage or destruction, a self-defense response would have been inappropriate. Had the
backup generators malfunctioned, this type of hacking attack, also could have potentially been
considered an act of war); but see Koh, supra note 62, at 4 (providing examples of when incidents

would likely constitute an appropriate use of force. Among these examples are "operations that
disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes).
117. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 47 (illustrating when a use of force reaches a certain level
of 'gravity').

118. See id. (citing that "the minor nature of an attack is prima facie evidence of absence of
intention to attack, of honest mistake, or simply the limited objectives of an attack." This would
mean that the attack is not grave enough to warrant an aggressive response of using force).
119. See 146 CONG. REc. H974, supra note 86, at H974-75 (detailing the previous low level
cyber threats and attacks on the United States).
120. See Kenyon, supra note 96 (emphasizing the potential disaster a Stuxnet-like attack
would have on the U.S. infrastructure. One of the reasons that Iran was able to combat the attack
in such a quick and efficient manner was because the infrastructure is government owned. In the
United States, much of the vital infrastructure is privately owned, raising issues on how quickly a
response would occur, if such a response needed to occur); see contra Corera, supra note 40, at
277 (likening the characteristics of Stuxnet to traditional intelligence operations rather than an act

of war. Because of how precise the virus was to Iran's centrifuges, it had to be specially designed
to ensure the success).
121. See Vinik, supra note 12 (distinguishing cyber capabilities from traditional weaponry
but alluding to the idea that the repercussions from a cyber capability could be similar to a
traditional kinetic weapon).
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cyber incident can produce. 122 In Iran, the nuclear plant was government
owned property, while in the United States most of the infrastructure is
privately owned. 123 It is understood that while civilian property may not
be the object of the attack, states may use force during conflict against
civilian property that supports "warfighting capability" during a
conflict. 124
B. A Cyber-Attack as an Armed Attack
Different considerations and qualifications constitute and distinguish
an armed attack from just a use of force, and thus, the analysis must be
slightly different. 125 An armed attack requires physical damage either to
people or property, and a cyber-attack can produce those results as seen
by the Stuxnet attack. 126 Examples of such armed attacks, as provided by
the Law of War Manual liken cyber-attacks to traditional, physical
attacks using the following example, "[A] bomb might break a dam and
flood a civilian population, but insertion of a line of malicious code from
a distant computer might just as easily achieve that same result." 12 7 While
the hacker at the New York dam was criminally charged, this forces the
analysis of whether this attack should have been considered an act of
war. 128
While this is a type of attack that the United States appears to
recognize as one that is comparable to one that would warrant a use of
force response, likely the proportionality of this attack on a small dam in

122. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 998 (comparing results of cyber actions to
the results of traditional warfare).
123. See Kenyon, supra note 96 (highlighting the differences between the Iran attack and
the potential attack on the United States).
124. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 41 (explaining when State's may use force against civilian

property. "States may use force during armed conflict, for example, against economic targets such
as . . . enemy lines of communication . . . and power generation plants." Because civilian
infrastructure is used for military purposes, it is subject to lawful attack during armed conflict. It
is recognized that technology and the increasing dependence on the Internet exacerbates this issue
and makes civilian infrastructure more vulnerable); see also Vinik, supra note 12 (questioning
how other similar rules may apply in the context of a cyber-attack. For example, in traditional
warfare, hospitals are off limits to attacks so then perhaps cutting off electricity to a hospital is
also an illegal act of warfare); Sharp, supra note 18, at 41.
125. See Dev, supra note 58, at 385 (citing to the Nicaragua judgment "measures which do

not constitute an armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force").
126. See id. (recognizing the necessary physical component to an armed attack).
127. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 998 (emphasizing the similar effect that a
cyber-attack would have to have on physical structures or persons to warrant a similar legal and
military response).
128. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 85 (articulating the criminal charges against the
Iranian hackers).
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New York would not warrant a responsive armed attack. 129 While the
scale of this particular incident was not enough to warrant a responsive
use of armed force, this is likely the type of incident that, on a larger scale,
would require a response of an armed attack. 130 However, had the hackers
successfully gained control of a piece of infrastructure such as the Hoover
Dam, the results likely would have been much graver-causing
destruction to civilians and civilian property. 131 The fact that the hackers
were able to gain access at all to the control systems of the dam,
regardless of its size, demonstrates a potential vulnerability and
opportunity for other hacker groups to take advantage of by manipulating
the systems that control the U.S. infrastructure. 132
Additionally, the Stuxnet worm was launched during a time of peace,
which forces the considerations of proportional responses. 133 The alleged
purpose of Stuxnet was to hinder Iran from having the ability to create an
atomic bomb and to avoid "collateral damage" by releasing the virus into
the networks controlling the centrifuges. 134 However, with this abnormal
attack, it seems that the repercussions could be greater than anyone
predicted and encourage other nations to create their own type of malware
to destroy U.S. infrastructure. 135

129. See Kutner, supra note 81 (explaining the physical appearance of the New York dam.
The dam in Rye Brook, New York is fairly small and is used to prevent local homes basements
from flooding. The dam is about 15 feet wide and two and a half feet tall. If the floodgate was
open during the time of a storm, it would have caused flooding to surrounding areas. In 2007,
when the dam flooded, a report suggested the damage cost nearly $80 million).
130. See Dev, supra note 58, at 387 (reemphasizing the necessity of resulting physical
damage to qualify as an armed attack); see also Koh, supra note 62, at 4 (highlighting specific
examples of when cyber activity would be categorized as a use of force. Examples of specific
actions that would be considered a use of force include operations that: trigger a nuclear plant
meltdown, open a dam above a populated area, and disrupt air traffic).
131. See Kutner, supra note 81 (speculating the potential damage to a more crucial piece of
American infrastructure. Where the Rye Brook, New York dam stood just 15 feet wide and two
and a half feet tall, the Hoover Dam is a concrete mammoth rising 726 feet high and 1244 wide).
132. See id. (recognizing the potential implications for other pieces of United States.

"Cybersecurity experts say if the Iranians were able to access it control system, they could also
likely get inside systems for more significant infrastructure, such as pipelines, mass transit

systems and power grids").
133. See Corera, supra note 40, at 278 (describing the factors surrounding the launch of
Stuxnet. While Stuxnet sent the signal that a cyber weapon was able to be made, essentially now

the "cat is out of the bag." This means that presumably other nations will be racing to create a
similar type of tool).
134. See id. at 276-77 (illuminating the purpose of what Stuxnet was designed to do. For
example, unlike the atomic bomb, Stuxnet was supposed to be a stealthier than an overt use of
force to achieve its objective).
135. See id. at 278-79 (predicting potential responses to Stuxnet. Former NSA and CIA

director Michael Hayden alludes the release of Stuxnet to the atomic bomb. "The use of the
weapon by the US is almost certain to act as a spur for others to try to develop the same capability
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C. Proportionalityof a Cyber-Attack
The United States is bound by the rules of proportionality, and before
launching a responsive attack, it must consider the potential effects on
military and civilian infrastructure, potential physical damage and the
potential effects on civilians that are not military objectives. 136 Though
the 1997 Worcester airport disruption and the more recent 2013 attack on
the dam in New York are examples of the types of incidents that would
likely be considered as types of attacks that could elicit an armed attack,
likely in these two instances the projected gravity of damage incurred
would not be considered enough to logically warrant a responsive use of
force. 137 In both instances, the perpetrators were charged criminally
instead of the U.S. military getting involved to launch a counter attack,
demonstrating that the two incidents likely did not necessarily need a full
scale military offensive to stop them from committing another offensive
act against the United States. 13 8 In these cases, the proportionality of an
armed attack likely would have been more devastating than a criminal
charge. 139
Both the disruption of air traffic and the hacking of the dam's control
system are examples of incidents that have been considered armed cyberattacks, yet neither were treated as such. 140 Both were treated as crimes
with the only repercussions being potential jail time because the physical
destruction was not grave enough to warrant a response of a retaliatory
as fast as they can. And Western countries may be most vulnerable to weapons like Stuxnet

because they are most connected").
136. See Koh, supra note 62, at 5 (providing factors that must be considered when
determining proportionality).
137. See 146 CONG. REc. 28, supra note 86, at 974-75 (explaining the consequences for the
perpetrator in the 1997 attack); see also Kutner, supra note 81 (detailing the issues with the New
York dam); see also Koh, supra note 62, at 4-5 (emphasizing the strict considerations a State
needs to imagine before launching a proportionate counter attack with force).
138. See Koh, supra note 62, at 4 (applying when the use of force may or may not be the

appropriate response. "The principles of necessity and proportionality limit uses of force in selfdefense and would regulate what may constitute a lawful response under the circumstances).

139.

See id. (acknowledging when a responsive attack may not be appropriate. "There is no

legal requirement that the response to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action, as

long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality"); see also DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 85 (discussing the monetary amount of damage. Though the remediation for
the New York Dam was assessed at over $30,000, that amount was not significant enough to
warrant a massive launch against a small group of Iranian hackers); see also Corera, supra note

40, at 285 (contrasting the effects of cybercrime to physical destruction. "Few would argue that
taking down some websites justified a fighter jet dropping a bomb, although many scholars,

including some in NATO, say the Stuxnet attack would").
140. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 998 (stating examples of considerable
cyber-attacks that mirror traditional physical attacks. The Law of War Manual expressly states
that cyber operations that would cause the opening of a dam or a disablement of air traffic control

services would be "regarded as a use of force under jus ad bellum").
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attack. 14 1 Had the cyber-attack on the New York Dam been aimed at a
larger scale target, such as the Hoover Dam, or if the air traffic control
disruption occurred at a larger airport, sources of international law give
authority to respond with a proportionate act of self-defense as well as
being scrutinized under the same legal standard as traditional, kinetic
attacks. 142
In the current state of technology, releasing a bit of code is never going
to be the same as physically dropping a bomb on a target and currently,
more lethal, traditional weapons still outnumber and outweigh the effects
of a potential cyber-attack. 143 The immediate severity of a cyber-attack
would not necessarily put soldiers at risk and does not involve the
movement of artillery or physical objects. 144 With so much critical
infrastructure of the United States being connected, cyber warfare is a
new route of warfare, but it does not yet replace traditional warfare, and
other actions in cyberspace may be hard to distinguish from actual attacks
of warfare. 14 5 A cyber-attack might be a part of warfare in the future, but
an entirely cyber war is unlikely to replace traditional warfare, and it is
necessary to evaluate and determine the current holes in the systems that
are in place now in order to install effective security measures so that they
are less susceptible to an attack. 146 Because it is accepted by the U.S. Law
of War Manual that international law applies in cyber space, and since
the United States abides by the U.N. Charter, it should follow that it
would be lawful to launch a proportionate cyber-attack on a nation who
launched one on U.S. infrastructure. 147
141. See Sharp, supra note 18, at 47 (reiterating a State's right to use self-defense and that
an armed attack is not always justified. A State always has an inherent right to self-defense,
however, it may not always be appropriate to respond with an act that falls short of an armed
attack).
142. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 998 (reinforcing the types of cyber-attacks
that would mirror traditional acts of war. Where cyber-attacks that would cause the same level of
destruction as a traditional physical attack, they should be categorized similarly, therefore
warranting analysis under the same legal standard); see also Himes, supra note 98 (emphasizing
the need for clarification and codification on the proper legal response if a large scale cyber-attack
occurs. In Congressman Himes' call for proper legislation articulating what the proper legal
response would be for the types of cyber-attacks that have already occurred in the United States
on a larger scale).
143. See Corera, supra note 40, at 292 (comparing traditional warfare with potential acts of
cyber warfare).
144. See Vinik, supra note 12 (declaring that cyber warfare in a way causes less damage
because there is not as much threat to human life).
145. See Corera, supra note 40, at 292 (highlighting the problems with defining what
constitutes cyber warfare).
146. See id. (illuminating the unlikely possibility in the foreseeable future that a war be
solely comprised of cyber capabilities).
147. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 6, at 994 (reiterating that "long-standing
international norms guiding state behavior-in times of peace and in times of conflict-also apply
in cyber space").

164

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 22

V. CONCLUSION

Applying the traditional principles set forth by the U.N. Charter and
other governing laws, a cyber-attack that causes physical destruction to
civilians or property will likely be construed as an attack of war, allowing
the United States to respond with proportionate force in the name of selfdefense. The United States has already been the target of attacks that
could be regarded as a lawful military engagement rising to a responsive
use of force, however, most incidents simply are heightened cyber
espionage actions. The U.S. energy grid is a target. Even though a cyberattack has yet to occur, the definitions and provisions of the Law of War
Manual, combined with the promulgations set forth by the U.N. Charter,
encompass and incorporate a cyber-attack to fit into the pre-existing legal
frameworks of both domestic and international law.

